Anecdotal evidence suggests that there have been three waves of immigration from the Middle
Immigrants in this wave were much better educated than those in the rst wave, with many immigrants being members of the established elite escaping countries that experienced popular revolutionary movements. The restrictive quota system put into place in 1924 was removed with the passage of the 1965
Immigration and Nationality Act. This opened up the doors for a massive increase in immigration from the Middle East, the third wave of immigration that continues until today. Nearly 800,000 people ocially immigrated to the US between 1967 and 2003 (Orfalea, 2006) . These immigrants had similar high levels of education to those in the second wave, but were far more numerous and a much higher percentage were Muslims. They have immigrated for a wide variety of reasons, ranging from seeking better economic opportunities to a general increase in religious, ethnic, and sectarian tensions in their homelands. 1 I am able to identify immigrants that arrived between 1910 and 2011, over 100 years of immigrant arrivals to the US. For these immigrants, I collect data on their educational outcomes, income, occupation, marital status, and residence within an ethnic enclave. I then use this data to see how demographic and economic characteristics of these immigrant groups may have changed over time.
My study examines several characteristics of these immigrant groups. The rst is educational achievement. On average, MENA migrants have higher levels of education than the average American.
However, education has not remained stable across immigrant cohorts. Supporting anecdotal evidence and as shown in Figure 1 , we observe a sharp rise in education up through the late 1960's immigrant cohorts. However, years of education peaks in 1969 then steadily falls until the late 1990's, where it begins to rise again. The drop in education after the 1960's is not entirely unexpected, given that the 1965 Immigration and Nationality Act made it easier to migrate to the US from the Middle East (thus opening up immigration as a viable option for a larger portion of the MENA population). The reversal of this trend may also be explained by an increasing demand for technical workers in the US or possibly more restrictive immigration policies in the wake of the September 11th attacks limiting immigration to only the most education migrants. In any event, the data indicates that lumping all migration since the late 1960's into a single wave may be awed. 1 The sixteen MENA countries are Algeria, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Israel/Palestine, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, Turkey, and Yemen. The South Asian countries are Bangladesh, India, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka. I also include Afghanistan in my sample, though this country does not t neatly into the MENA or South Asia classication. It does, however, match up with countries that have sent large numbers of refugees to the US such as Iraq and Somalia. MENA countries that were not selected were left out because of a small number of migrants in the US, particularly for early immigrant cohorts. More interesting results can be observed by looking at how these trends have changed across dierent countries. Figure 2 presents years of education across immigrant cohorts for Egypt, the Levant, and Turkey. We observe the same increase in education during the second wave of the 1940's-1960's.
However, there is not the same steady decline in education after 1965. Rather, we see education levels across immigrant cohorts staying fairly stable up until the mid to late 1980's. From there we can see a steady increase in the education levels of immigrants from all countries except for Egypt, whose immigrants keep basically the same education levels from the late 1960's through the mid 2000's.
There is a strong divergence in the last few immigrant cohorts, however. Strong increases in Jordan, Lebanon, and Turkey (especially) are tempered by a modest drop in Egypt and a severe decline in Syria. These declines may be indicative of refugees from these countries moving to the United States to escape dangerous situations in their home countries rather than economically motivated migration. In addition to evaluating immigrants based on education levels, I will also analyze income levels, occupational concentrations, and cultural assimilation across both immigrant cohorts and source countries.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section II will present a closer look at the dened waves of immigration within the context of US immigration policy and events in the Middle East. Section III discusses the construction of the datset used in this study. Section IV presents a few empirical results and their signicance and Section V will conclude with an assessment of why these results matter for research into the economics of immigration from the Middle East. The rst wave, from the 1870's to the mid 1920's consisted mostly of immigrants from the Ottoman province of Syria (comprising modern day Lebanon, Palestine, and Syria). This wave was a predominantly Christian population and pushed to immigrate due to years of inghting between the Druze and Christians in Syria as well as to avoid conscription in the Ottoman Army. The declining economic prospects in the Ottoman empire were certainly a motivating factor as well (Kayyali, 2006 (Suleiman, 1999) . Evidence of this result in my data is the percentage of MENA migrants who have American born spouses. Figure 4 presents the fraction of immigrants by arrival cohort who have native-born spouses. For both men and women, we see a clear trend that earlier cohorts were much more likely to marry American born spouses than later cohorts. For the 1960 cohort, 40% of immigrants from the MENA and South Asia were married to American born spouses.
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After this peak, we see a precipitous decline in the fraction of immigrants married to American-born spouses. The patterns for men and women are similar, with men being slightly more likely to marry an American born wife, though this dierence is much less pronounced in later cohorts.
As measured by intermarriage, it appears that cultural assimilation has signicantly decreased during the third wave of immigration as compared to the 1st and 2nd waves. This result is reinforced when we consider the ancestry of the American-born spouse of immigrants from the MENA and South Asia over time. Table 1 presents the fraction of American-born spouses that have the same ethnicity as the immigrants they marry. For all groups, we observe a large increase in the same-ancestry spouses, suggesting a reduction in cultural assimilation.
way, the results indicate that more recent migrants are more likely to stay within their communities.
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This result also holds in the popular perception of the American public. A study by Timberlake and Williams (2012) surveyed registered voters in the state of Ohio and found that those surveyed felt that immigrants from the Middle East were the least likely group of immigrants to assimilate into American culture. That said, the same study did nd that Middle Eastern immigrants were perceived as being on average more successful and less of a drain on public resources than most other immigrant groups. Interestingly, the patterns presented in Table 1 vary across source country when we consider gender dierences. Table 2 gives the fraction of same-ethnicity American-born spouses for both men and women. For migrants for South Asia and Somalia/Sudan, a much higher percentage of the Americanborn spouses of immigrant women share the same ethnicity as their wives. This may be due to cultural norms from these regions in which it is much less socially acceptable for a woman to marry outside of her ethnic group. There is almost no dierence between men and women for immigrants from the Middle East. For the most recent cohort for Iran, immigrant women are much more likely to marry outside of their ethnic group. These results suggest that later cohorts of immigrants are quite dierent from their predecessors and these dierences do in fact vary across source country. 5 This may actually be a positive for these communities in terms of the educational outcomes of 2nd and 3rd generation immigrants. Results in a previous study (Foad, 2013) found that the educational and income outcomes of children who have one immigrant parent and one native born parent (Generation 2.5) are actually lower than those with two immigrant parents. This may be due to stresses in family environment due to cultural dierences. This result was specic to Middle Eastern migration to the US, however. Ramakrishnan (2004) looks at immigrants to the US from all source countries and nds that Generation 2.5 does a little bit better than Generation 2.0. He argues that having one native-born parent gives children an advantage in terms of knowledge about entry into the mainstream economy and greater access to educational and employment opportunities. Why the results are dierent for Middle Eastern immigrants is a very interesting question that merits further research.
2.3
The Third Wave: 1965-present
The third wave of immigration began with the passage of the 1965 Immigration and Nationality Act.
This law abolished the restrictive quota system that had been in place since 1924 as well as allowed for the naturalization of immigrants from Asia. With the passage of this law, the doors were opened for large scale immigration from regions of the world that had been previously denied. Currently about 12% of the US population is foreign born, about the same fraction as a century ago. However, there has been a tremendous shift in the composition of the foreign born population. In 1900, about 80%
of the immigrant population were from Europe. By 2000, the European share had fallen down to 16% (Timberlake and Williams, 2012) . A signicant portion of this shift has been an increase in immigration from the Middle East. For example, Camarota (2002) estimates that the number of immigrants from the Middle East has increased more than sevenfold since 1970.
Demographically, the immigrants that arrived during this period were similar to those that came in the last wave, but they were far more numerous. Table 3 presents selected summary statistics across these groups for the Census years 1980, 1990, 2000, and 2010 .
Looking rst at education, we can see that MENA and South Asian migrants have higher rates of college graduation than the general US population. The exception are the Somalis and Sudanese, who have seen a large decline in their college graduation rates with the inux of refugees from these war stricken countries. For the other three groups, there has been a general upward trend, with graduation rates rising most strongly for the MENA group, displaying a 53% increase between the 1980 and 2010
Census samples compared to a 26% increase for Iranians and a 7% increase for South Asians. That said, the general US population experienced a 72% increase in college graduates over this same period, suggesting that the educational advantage these groups have enjoyed may be eroding.
The results for income are in line with the higher educational outcomes of migrants from the MENA and South Asia. On average, these groups have higher incomes than the general US population, but again the average income for the Somali/Sudanese group is lower. Interestingly, it appears that the income gap between these groups and the general US population has been growing. Between 1980 and 2000, total personal income increased by a factor of 2.4 for the general US population (in nominal terms!). Over this same period, income increased by a factor of 2.7 for the MENA group, 3.7 for Iranians, and 2.5 for South Asians. Incomes for Somalis and Sudanese only increased by a factor of (Stock, 2009 ).
Clearly, their push has not been as successful among MENA and South Asian migrants. Whether this is due to US foreign policy in many of these migrants native countries or simply because these migrants tend to be better educated (and thus likely to enlist), an important aspect of the American immigrant story is being missed here.
A common pattern among immigrant groups to the United States is occupational clustering, where immigrants tend to be more heavily represented in specic occupations than the general US population.
For example, Toussaint-Comeau (2006) nds that Hispanic immigrants tend to cluster in low skill occupations such as food service and farming occupations, partially explaining their relatively low earnings.
A similar result is found for migration to the UK by Elliott and Lindley (2008) , albeit with less of an eect on the immigrant wage penalty. Occupational clustering appears to be occurring for MENA and South Asian migrants as well. In addition to occupational clustering, immigrants tend to concentrate in ethnic enclaves, locations in which immigrants are more prevalent than the general US population. Several studies have examined the impact of living in an ethnic enclaves on the earnings and education of immigrants. On the positive side, living in an ethnic enclave should reduce the cost of immigration and limit the discrimination in labor markets that many immigrants face. Furthermore, the returns to pre-immigration human capital should be higher (i.e. native country language skill may be more valuable when surrounded by people who speak that language.) Edin et. al. (2003) examine the eects of ethnic enclaves of refugees in Sweden, nding that immigrants living in enclaves have wages 13% higher than those outside the enclaves. Further support for the positive eects of ethnic enclaves is given by Gang et. al. (2000) , who nd that living in an ethnic enclave has increases the educational outcomes of 2nd generation immigrants in Germany.
There are several reasons to believe that living in an enclave could have negative eects. The need to assimilate is reduced, which could lower human capital investments. The skill set that is acquired for life in the enclave may also not be as transferable to life outside the enclave. For example, a child living in an ethnic enclave will not have as much pressure to learn English, which is ne within the enclave, but harmful if that child were to ever leave. Grönqvist (2006) looks at immigrants in Sweden and nds that for second generation immigrants, living in an ethnic enclave reduces the probability that they will graduate from high school. Further evidence of the negative eect of enclaves on educational outcomes is given by Chiswick and Miller (2001) , who nd that living in an ethnic enclave is negatively related to English language prociency for immigrants to Canada. Given the results in the existing literature regarding the importance of enclave characteristics, I dene two variables to capture the eects of living in an ethnic enclave. The variable Enclave is equal to 1 if the agglomeration index for a particular community in a county is greater than 3 (i.e. immigrants from that group are at least three times more likely to live there than the average American). From this variable I then create a subcategory for high skill enclaves. The variable HiEnclave is equal to 1 if the average years of education amongst immigrants in an enclave is at least half a standard deviation above the average across all enclaves for that immigrant group in a specic census year. Across my sample, high skill enclaves represent 25% of all enclaves. Within enclaves, the average years of education is 14.4. In highly skilled enclaves, immigrants average 15.9 years of education.
Empirical Model and Results

The Determinants of Education
To assess the factors that inuence immigrant education, I estimate the following baseline model:
Education is a function of the immigrant's arrival cohort, their age, and whether or not they live in an ethnic enclave. To this baseline model, I add dummy variables for the following regions of origin: Iran, South Asia, Afghanistan, and Somalia/Sudan (MENA is the control group). I also estimate a model in which these region dummies are interacted with ethnic enclaves to assess how dierent enclaves inuence education as compared to MENA enclaves. Table 7 presents these estimates.
Holding age and enclave status constant, it appears that average years of education are falling with immigrant cohort. In other words, immigrants who have arrived in more recent years of my sample Heteroskedasticity consistent p-values in brackets. Enclave is equal to 1 if immigrants from a a given source region are at least three times more likely to live in a county than the average American, as dened by the agglomeration index discussed in Section 3. The control group for the regional dummies are the MENA countries (excluding Iran).
tend to have less education than those that arrived earlier. This result supports the observation in Ethnic enclaves appear to lead to negative educational outcomes, with an average of 0.4 fewer years 6 My data under-samples the earliest immigration cohorts, so the positive trend in immigration education prior to 1965 is getting washed out here. I have tried adding a squared term for year of immigration, but the resulting estimate is not signicantly dierent from zero.
of education for immigrants living in these enclaves. There is almost certainly some reverse causality here, though, as less educated immigrants may choose to live in these enclaves due to a higher cost for these immigrants of assimilating outside an enclave. Of course, not all enclaves are the same. Adding interaction terms with the regional dummies allows us to compare how these enclaves act as incubators of human capital relative to the MENA control group. In model 3, we see that MENA enclaves neither increase or decrease educational outcomes. There is also no discernible dierence between MENA enclaves and Iranian enclaves. Immigrants living in South Asian enclaves appear to have 0.7 more years of education, while Afghan enclaves also appear to be doing a better job of fostering education. On the other side, Somali and Sudanese enclaves appear to be dragging down the educational outcomes of their residents, with 0.6 fewer years of education. One possible explanation for the better performance of South Asian enclaves is that there are better economic opportunities in these enclaves. For example, 15% of South Asians living in enclaves work as executives or managers, compared to 9% working in these positions outside of enclaves. This suggests that there are a greater number of South Asian owned businesses and opportunities for advancement in these enclaves. With better prospects, more educated South Asians will choose to live in an enclave rather than seek their fortunes elsewhere. While the fraction of immigrants holding executive positions is higher within enclaves for other immigrant groups is also higher than without, the dierence is not nearly as large as it is for the South Asian group. Furthermore, MENA and Somali/Sudanese enclaves have a greater proportion of low paying occupations such as food service, production, and sales.
How do the determinants of education vary across immigrant wave? Table 8 presents these results by running separate regressions for seven dierent waves of immigration. First consider the impact of ethnic enclaves on education. For early immigrant waves, enclaves had a strong and negative eect. This is consistent with a relatively new immigrant community that has yet to establish roots and provide viable economic opportunities for skilled workers within enclaves. Over time, however, the negative eect of enclaves diminishes, eventually becoming insignicant for the most recent immigrant cohorts.
Looking across the regional dummies, it appears that relative to other immigrant groups, the education levels of MENA migrants (the control group) reached its nadir in the 1965-1974 immigrant cohort. For this cohort, Afghan, Iranian, and South Asian migrants had between 1-3 more years of education than MENA migrants, who were no more or less educated than migrants from Somalia/Sudan. For more recent cohorts, Iranian and South Asian migrants still tend to be better educated, though the gap is not as large. For migrants from Afghanistan and Somalia/Sudan, the eect of refugee populations in more recent cohorts is quite stark. For example, the most recent cohort of Somali/Sudanese migrants has on average 5 fewer years of education than a MENA migrant in this cohort.
The Return to Education
Having evaluated dierences in education across immigrant groups and arrival cohorts, our attention turns to evaluating the return to immigrant education. I estimate the following model:
For this semi-log model, an approximation of the return to education is that for every year of education, income increases by β 1 %. I also control for immigrant cohort, residence in an ethnic enclave, residence in a high-skill ethnic enclave and a non-linear relationship between age (proxying for experience) and income. I then augment this model with dummy variables for immigrant source region as well as interactions between years of education and source dummies to see if education returns dier across these regions.
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7 A clear aw in this methodology is the well documented omitted variable bias in this kind of Mincer wage equation. Namely, we are omitting an immigrant's ability, which is clearly positively correlated with both education and earnings, leading us to overestimate the return to education. A future revision of this paper will address this issue. As I am more 1910-1944 1945-1964 1965-1974 1975-1984 1985-1994 1995-2004 2005-2011 The dependent variable is the years of education for an immigrant
Looking at the baseline model, I estimate a return to education of 12%. This is not too far from the 10.8% return to education estimated by Aly and Ragan (2010) for MENA migrants to the US in the 2000 Census. The year of immigration has a signicantly negative eect on income, with income falling by 0.3% for every successive year that an immigrant arrived. Finally, incomes within enclaves overall are lower than those outside. However, incomes in high skill enclaves are signicantly higher than either other kinds of enclaves or for those immigrants living outside enclaves. Keep in mind that we are controlling for years of education, so this result is not just picking up better educated immigrants in these enclaves. Rather, there do appear to be some positive neighborhood eects in these enclaves.
Adding in the immigrant source dummies, a similar pattern to the determinants of education regression emerges. Relative to MENA migrants, South Asian incomes are 10.2% higher, while Afghan and Somali/Sudanese incomes are 15.4% and 19.7% lower. The third column of Table 9 gives the return to education across dierent source regions relative to the MENA. The return to education for Iranian and South Asian migrants are 1.2% and 3.2% above that for MENA migrants, while those for Afghan and Somali migrants are 3.3% and 2.6% lower. Table 10 presents estimates of the return to education regression across immigrant waves. The same seven waves dened in Table 8 are used here. As before, incomes tend to be lower in immigrant enclaves, though the eect of enclaves on income is insignicant for the most recent wave of migrants.
This may suggest that enclaves have a positive eect on wages for newly arrived immigrants, but those immigrants that stay in these enclaves long after they arrive in the US tend to have lower income. Of course, the type of enclave matters too. Hi skill enclaves generate higher incomes across all arrival cohorts.
The return to education peaks in the 1945-1964 wave, with each year of education leading to approximately a 12.5% increase in earnings. For each successive immigrant wave, the return to education falls, concerned with dierences in the return to education across groups and arrival cohort, then this omitted variable bias may be less important if the magnitude of the bias is the same across these categories. The dependent variable is the log wage for an immigrant dropping down to 7% for the most recent wave. Looking across immigrant groups, the return to education for South Asians is higher than that for the MENA. This gap has been rising across arrival cohorts, Why would the return to education dier across migrant groups? Aly and Ragan (2010) nd that an immigrant's return to education is a function of economic development and the quality of schooling in their home country.
8 This is signicant as, average educational attainment has nearly tripled in
Conclusion
The results in this study suggest that immigration from the Middle East and South Asia varies across both source countries and the year of immigration. While immigrants from these regions tend to be better educated than the general US population, there has been a general downward trend in both immigrant education and the immigrant wage premium for arrival cohorts since the passage of the 1965 Immigration and Nationality Act. Thus, grouping all immigrants who arrived in this period into a common third wave may be awed. One thing these later migrants do have in common, however, is a lower degree of cultural assimilation as measured by the percentage who marry American-born spouses. This percentage, around 40% just before the 1965 shift, has steadily fallen an now sits well below 10%. Furthermore, those immigrants who do marry American-born spouses are increasingly marrying spouses within their own ethnic group.
The eect of ethnic enclaves on educational outcomes and years of education depends on the characteristics of the enclave as well as how long the immigrants have been living in these enclaves. In general enclaves tend to have negative eects, though there is evidence that South Asian enclaves attract more highly skilled immigrants. This may be due to the higher percentage of immigrants employed in high paying occupations such as executives and managerial occupations within those enclaves. When enclaves are separated by the skill level of the immigrants living there, we see that the high-skill enclaves have a signicantly positive eect on education and earnings, suggesting the presence of neighborhood eects. Finally, the negative eects of enclaves in general tends to fall for more recent immigrants, even becoming positive for the incomes of the most recent arrival cohort. This suggests that enclaves may be helpful for the newest arrivals, but those that stay in enclaves tend to be less educated and have lower incomes. Given the nuances in these immigrant groups, a better understanding of how they very over source country and arrival cohort is critical to both policymakers and researchers.
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